speak of God or the other in general?" (IND 226). 5 In other words, can Levinas's Taut Aulre be rigorously distinguished from any other "other?" Doesn't Levinas "set up [s'installe] an analogy between the relation of Moses to God and the relation of man to man, that is of every other to every other, of every other to the wholly other, to every other of the wholly other, to the utterly other of the wholly other [de taut aulre d taut aUlre, au tautaulre de taut aulre]"? (!ND 226, myemphasis).
If there is such an analogy between the relation of Moses to God and the relation to the other, this gives rise to a number of questions: How are we to read this analogy? How are the terms of the analogical relation (God, for example) and the analogical relation itself read in Derrida's work, so that the relatiol1 of Moses to God can be designated as "the paradigmatic" relation? Further, how is the function of the paradigm re-worked in Derrida 6 In "Violence and Metaphysics" Derrida had taken Levinas to task, arguing that the descriptions of the relation to Autrui detailed in Totality and Injinity evoked "the Lord speaking face to face with Moses" (ED 160/108). 7 The resemblance of the Face of Yahweh-never explicitly mentioned in Totality andInjini!y-to that of Autruiwas, for Derrida, the sign of an "equivocal complicity between theology and metaphysics in Totality and Infini!J?' (ED 160/108-9). Levinas's ethics, then, was inevitably contaminated by an inescapable theological conceptuality, making it susceptible to a critique of onto-theologyr. Yet, many years mter, Derrida cites this very relationship of Moses to God as the paradigm for all relations to the other. How are we to assess Derrida's seemingly conttadictory account in Morocco in light of bis earlier condemnation? Is it the case, as many suspect or fear, or as theyalways suspected, that Derrida has become unseemly religious? Or is Derrida's re-reading of the analogy between the relation of Moses to God and that of the relation to the other, part of an enriched approach to Levinas's corpus, a re-appreciation of Levinas, mainly marked in Derrida's work not specifically devoted to Levinas--a reconsideration fully aware of the aporias of giving and generosity, gratefulness and ingratitude-that has been taking place for more than two decades? Is it perhaps a case of the reinscription of certain initially censured terms-terms such as the absolutely other, experience, religion, and so on-allowing the terms and the relation to Levinas to be read anew?8
In ''Violence and Metaphysics," a long, wide-ranging, detailed, and dense essay wbich for many in France and elsewhere served as the first introduction to Levinas's work and has to a certain extent determined the reception of Levinas's work, Derrida presented Levinas's challenge to Husserlian phenomenology and Heideggerian ontology as a fundamental thinking of the other [/'autre]. In a multiriered, complex examination of Levinas's reading of Husserl and Heidegger, Derrida employed the double gesture of (1) using the resources of the very thinker criticized by Levinas to pose questions to Levinas's own interpretations, and (2) in a further twist, using a Husserlian orientation to question Levinas's interpretation of Heidegger and a Heideggerian path to criticize Levinas's take on Husserl. Since its republication in Writing and Dijfercnce in 1967, this complicated essay has acquired the status of a canonical text, conveniencly becoming the obligatory reference and final arbiter whenever the question of the relation between Derrida and Levinas is raised, even though the issues at stake in it are far from clear.
Even it: since then, Derrida has devoted a number of other texts to Levinas-in particular, '~t 1bis Very Moment in 1bis Work Here I am" (1980) and Adieu (1996)-and the explicit references to Levinas's texts have grown exponentially over the years (for example, in Thc Gift of Death, Politics of Fricndship, u toucher, ]can-Luc Nanry, and "L'animal que done je suis")-many still seem to eonsider "Violenee and Metaphysics" as the last word whenever the relation between the two thinkers is broached, in particular whenever any discussion of "the other" is concerned. The other-this term, notion or concept, which has been worn away by so much misuse, contributing to its banality, which has become a mantra in so many quarters, serving as shorthand for liberal concern for diversity and multiculturalism-has become a liability. There is too much talk of the other, we are told. And yet, we cannot do away with the other, since the other and the relation to the other are at the heart of the celebrated chiasm that joins and separates the oeuvres of Levinas and Derrida.
Part of the difficulty of appealing to ''Violence and Metaphysics"
to resolve all differences and to explain the relation between two thinkers, Let us now follow very closely Derrida's argumentation in ''Violence and Metaphysics" in order to examine how he sets out to contest Levinas's interpretation and to demonstrate that Husserl's work is in fact rigorously faithful to the alterity of the other. 9 Derrida raises a number of points, the most important of which are: (1) the status and (2) appearing of the alter ego, (3) the mediate relationship to the other or analogical appresentation, (4) the alterity of bodies, and (5) the economic relationship between symmetry and asymmetr)r.
(1) The AlterEgo as Ego. The criticism that Levinas has leveled at Husserl is that he maintains that the other [l'autre] as alter ego is known through sympathy-"as another like myself" (ED 184/125 . There has to be, Derrlda insists J "a cer/ain appearing of the other as other to an ego" (ED 181/123, my italics). It would be impossible to encounter the alter ego and respect it in experlence and language ''without this other, in its alterity, appearing for an ego (in general)" (ED 181/123). There has to be a phenomenon of the totally other, "otherwise one could neither speak, nor have any sense of the totally other [tout-autre], or evidence of the totally other as such" (ED 181/123). But the other as other is "the phenomenon of a certain non-phenomenality," its mode of appearing is that of "an originary non-presence" (ED 181/123). Thus Husserl's writings, Derrlda states, can be said to "describe the system of the phenomenality of nonphenomenality" (ED 183/125). The other [/~utre], "phenomenality as disappearance [comme disparition]:' 'appears' but never as such (ED 190/ 129) . It is this appearing of the other [/~utre] as what I can never be, Derrida notes, this "originary non-phenomenality:' that is examined as "the intentionalphenomenon of the ego" (ED 182/123).
(3) The Mediate Relationship to the Other orAnalogicalAppresentation. Husserl's central concern in the relationship with the other is "the irreducibfy mediate character of intentionality aiming at [viran~the other as other" (ED 182/123). Husserl is most insistent that "the other as transcendental other (the other absolute origin and the other zero point in the orientation of the world)" can never be given to me in person, but only through analogical appresentation (ED 182/124).
1°T he alter ego cannot present itseIt: it cannot become an originary presence for the ego, it can never be given "in person;' thus resisting the principle of principles of phenomenology-namely, the intuitive given of originary presence. 11 Derrida notes that the relation of analogical appresentation is not an assimilating reduction of the other to the same, but rather "confirms and respects separation, the unsurpassable necessity of (nonobjective) mediation...If I attained the other immediately and originally, silently, in communion with the other's own experience, the other would cease to be the other" (ED 182/124). Contrary to appearances, appresentative transposition recognizes "the radical separation of absolute origins, the relation of absolved absolutes [absolus absous] and non-violent respect for the secret" (ED 182/124).
Throughout all of bis writings, Derrida never abandons the importance accorded to analogical appresentation in bis reading of Husserl. Over thirty years later in Le toueher, Jean-Lue Nanry, Derrida, while praising "Husserlian prudence" as "a model of vigilance,"
reiterates the necessity of turning to analogical appresentation. 12 Noting the "unsurpassable abyss [abime infranehissable]" separating me from the other, Derrida emphasizes that the other ["aUlre] is never given to me immediately, is never "presented" directly, but is "apprehended" in an indirect relationship. My access to the body (Leib) of the other, he writes in Le toucher, is only possible in "an indirect fashion, by appresentation, comparison, analogy, projection, and introjection" (LT 217). My relation to the other's body, in contrast to the relation the other has to its own body, can only be through appresentation. The other, ''Jrom its point of view [de son cote1, whieh will never be mine, has an originary relation to its body," the same way I have to mine, wbich I will never have with its (LT 217). I can never have an experience of the other's body as if I were on its side. Thus "one must be vigilant about the alterity of the other [ilfaut veiller aI'altente de "aulre] : the latter will always remain inaccessible to an originary giving [donatriee] intuition, an immediate and direct presentation of here [ia] " (LT 218). Even though I may know or feel that "there is an other here [ia] ," this other 'here' presents itself as that which will never be mine. It is not possible to confuse me and the other because "the alterity of the alter ego can never be reappropriated in the ownness [Ie propre] of 'my ego'" (LT 220). Bach of ourworlds is untranslatable, Derridawrites, and at bottom there will never be the 'same world' [au fond il ny aurajamais de «(meme monde»] (LT 220). There is an irreducible difference between us-I have a direct and originary intuition of my body and an indirect appresentation that gives me access to the other. The interiority of the other cannot be given to me immediately, it cannot be my interior life. I have access to the other, but only as other and not as another me.
(4) Things and Alten!) in General. In ''Violence and Metaphysics,"
Derrida is also keen to point out that Husserl's attentiveness to alterity is not simply confined to that of the alter ego but also applies to the alterity of things: "Bodies, transcendent and natural things are others 
(5) AnEconomicRelation--Symmetry andDis-!Jmmetry.
It is important to note that without the alterity of bodies [les cops] (and autmi is, after all, also a body), the alterity of autmi could never emerge (ED 183/ 124). Derrida underscores that these two alterities-the alterity of bodies and the alterity of autru~neinscribed in the other, need to be thought together. This is why the alterity of autrui is doubly irreducible, "by a double powerof indefiniteness" (ED 183/124). The other remains infinitely other because "the subjective face of his 14 The other cannot be absolutely "absolved" of relation to an ego; it cannot be absolutely exterior to the same without ceasing to be other. In other words, the other, even though utterly other, according to Derrida, must have some relation to the same. This would mean that the same cannot be a totality closed in upon itself, "an identity playing with itself with only the appearance of alterity" (ED 186/126). Citing Heidegger's 1denti!Y and Difference, where the same presupposes mediation, relation, and difference, Derrida argues that "the 'play of the Same'" is ooIy possible when alterity is already lodged in the Same (ED 186/126-7).
(At this juncture it is essential to open a parenthesis to address the expression "infinitely other" or "absolutely other [absolument autre]" which, Derrida is to have stated, cannot be said and thought at the same time. This has led certain commentators, who hold steadfast to this as an iron-clad rule, to claim that what distinguishes Derrida from Levinas is that for the former the other can never be said to be "absolutefy other." However, this would make it difficult to explain away the use by a concept or thought on the basis of a horizon, since the concept supposes an anticipation and a horizon. For Levinas, the encounter with the other has the form of separation, the ttace of which is at the heart of all experience (ED 141-2/95).
The infinitely other is invisible; it shows itself or appears in a certain non-manifestation (ED 135/91). It is in the face that the other is "given over in person as olher [livre enpersonne comme autre], dlat is, as that which does not revea1 itseIt: as that wmch does not allow itself to be thematized" (ED 152/103). The face wmch "is not of 'the world,'" can only be reached as the inaccessible, the separate, the invisible, the intangible, and the secret (ED 153/103). to define or grasp the other, but its insistent rhythm strives to respect the singularity of the other. For, as Levinas comments, the relation to the other is "prior to the negative or aEfirmative proposition; it first institutes language, where neither the no nor the yes is the first word" However, the relation with tout aulre as such is a relation. This rapportsans rapportis aparadoxicalrelationship: ''A relation without relation to any other relation," a relation with that which because of its "alterity and transcendance makes the relation impossible."23 In order to enter into relation with the other, it is necessary that an interruption be possible and that the relation be "a relation of interruption." However, this interruption does not simply interrupt the relation with the other; rather it opens the relation to it. In fact, all social bonds and ries presuppose and are made possible by such an interruption. As well as a relation of interruption, there is simultaneously a certain mediation in the relation to the other. In this other experience of mediationnot to be confused with a relation of reconciliation and totalizationthe other is understood as other in a certain relation of incomprehension. It is necessary that, at a given moment, the other remain as other.
Thus the relation to the other is twofold: there is (1) a suspension of opposition between binary oppositions, a mediation without opposition. At this moment one is in economy: between all oppositions there is no distinction or opposition, there is a difference (e.g. between nature and culture, where culture is nature differed and deferred, etc.), and at the same time (2) precisely because it suspends the opposition, there is a radical heterogeneity, the mark of radical difference or aneconomy. The relation to the other then is constituted by the two logics of economy (mediation without opposition) and aneconomy (radical alterity), relation and interruption of relation, interruption and negotiation.
Resemblance to God
Let us now return to the analogy between the relation to the other and the relation of Moses to God with which we began. Areading of analogy, as we shall shoW; is already hinted at in "Violence and Metaphysics:' but it is Derrida's subsequent work on analogy that will enable us to read the analogical relation as resemblance anddifference, economy and aneconomy.24 ''The question of analogy" is itself raised in a discussion of the relation of Levinas'work to Hegel's (ED147-8/ 100). It is worth noting that Derrida italicizes the term "analogy" there, thus signaling that it is not being used in a conventional manner.25 This practice is true of practically every reference to analogy in Derrida's work. Referring to Levinas's statement that ''Thought is language and is thought in an element analogous to sound and not to light," Derrida asks: ''What does analogy mean here, difference and resemblance, a relation between the sensible sound and the sound of thought as intelligible speech, between sensibility and signification, the senses and sense?"(ED 147-8/99). Levinas employs an unusual analogy relating thought to speech in terms of sound rather than vision and light, an analogy rarely used in philosophy (hence one of the reasons for Derrida's subsequent use of the phrase "an almost unheard-of analogy''). If, according to Levinas, thought is language and more akin to sound than to light, then thought is being equated with speech, a living speech. Further, if: as Levinas claims, thought hears the invisible (God), then all speech [discours] would be a conversation with God.
We know that in This "almost unheard-of" analogy, Derrida writes, is also the movement of Levinas's own discourse. In other words, Levinas's discourse (on discourse, that is, speech with God) is itself a speech addressed to God, making the status of bis text, oE an his writings, analogous to a conversatton or dialogue with God The nudity oE the face-speech and look-is analogous to divine speech, the speech rl1at instantaneously presents the speaker. The relation to God, in language and conversation, is therefore pre-supposed in every face-toface, and speech with God, always in the background, serves as "guarantor" for all face-to-face relations. 1t is in trus sense that Derrida can write, paraphrasing Levinas, that the dissymmetrical relation to the other "is, perhaps, the very presence of God" (ED 159/108). Yet this "presence" is a strange presence:
Presence as separation, presence-absence as resemblance, but resemblance which is not the 'ontological mark' oE the worker imprinted on bis product (Descartes) or on 'beings created in his image and resemblance' ·Ialebranche),a resemblance which can be understood neither in terms of communion or knowledge, nor in terms oEparticipation and incamation. (ED 159-60/108) For Levinas, this resemblance, which is not a sign or an effect of God, places us "in the Trace of God" (ED 160/108). But it is precisely this "resemblance" of man to God, the determination of Anlrui by its 58 resemblance to God, which prevents the face from appearingin relation with other beings: "It is the analogy between the face and God's visage [Ie visage avecJaface de Dieu] that, in the most classical fashion, distinguishes man from animal....Man's substantiality, which permits him to be face, is thus founded in his resemblance to God who is thus the Face [Le Virage] and absolute substantiality" (ED 210/142). Levinas's theological conceptuality---or at least his rhetoric-reinforces the identification of the absolutely other as Autrui, my fellow human, and not as thir other, whether animal, living, non-living, etc. Derrida remarks that Levinas's use of the language of "substance" ("perhaps man alone is substance"), refers us to the scholastic problematic of analogy, but he prefers to leave trus issue aside (ED 210/143).31
Rethinking Analogy-Difference and Resenlblance
The relation to the other opens up aspace that is not necessarily simply theological but can also function as the source of theological discourse. As Derrida remarks regarding Levinas's entire enterprise, "trus return to experience and 'to the things themselves,' as a relation to the infinteQy) other is not theological, even if it alone has the power afterward to found theological discourse" (ED 159/107-8). If God, the most proper name, were not thought of as a substance, an ineffable Being, apresence, a final anchor term, but rather was the name of an "endless desertification of language,"32 if the name of God were the result of an always possible "movement of the effacement of the trace in presence" (ED 160/108), then the 'theological' would be, as Derrida writes in Of Grammato/gJ, "a determinant moment in the total movement of the trace,"33 an "effect of the trace" (ED 160/108). God would be, a "nominal effect" within "the chains of substitutions of names:' a name substituting yet another totally other for the wholly other. 34 This possibility of infinite substitution, the infinite substitution of the infinite, allows "God" to stand for the name, one of the substitutable names, of the unsubstitutable. Such an account would, of course, break with all the monothcistic doctrines of the oneness, uniqueness, and unsubstitutability of God. It is said that the absolute uniqueness of Yahweh does not lend itself to analogy, yet in trus uniqueness and irreplaceability analogy begins.35 Thus when we say that the relation to the other resembles the relation of Moses to God, we mean that not only is there a formal resemblance between the two relations but that "the other" shares a number of characteristics with what we call "God." There is a structural analogy between the two relations.
In This return is guided by the function of resemblance (homoiosis): the proper and the metaphor reflect and refer to each other, where the proper noun has a single sense and means only one thinge The logical and metaphysical anteriority of that which is resembled is never contested. Traditional analogy also assumes that the identity of the terms in the analogical relation and their relationships are evident, known, and stable. In od1er words, all the terms are either present or can come to presence. The relation or analogy between two relations is itself dominated and named by one of the terms within the relation of relations, for example, in our case, God. The name of the relation is the same as that of one of its terms and all the terms are comprehended in the structure of this one term. ''This comprehension:' accorcling to Derrida, "is an act of domination and decision."41 Thus the relation itself is comprehended and decided in favor of one of its terms. "God," then would dominate the other terms of the analogy, swallowing them up, incorporating them.
For Derrida, in the analogy of the relation to the other to that of the relation of Moses to God-analogy displaced, analogy otherwise, an almost-unheard of "analogy:' analogy and heterology-what the terms of the analogy name, for example "God" or "the other," are not the proper names referring to a unique thinge The analogy does not refer back to a fixed term or an undivided origin. The relation to both, the other and God, is an indirect, reticent rapport to a certain obscurity and remoteness. What both relations have in common is a structural similarity: both are asymmetrical relations to that which is infinitely distant, to what cannot be seen or immediately presented. The description of one relation-for example, the characteristics of the relation to the other-can then shine a light, albeit a nocturnal gloW; on the other relation. Following the same logic to its limit, we could say that the relation to the other and the relation of Moses to God are at once analogous, they share a certain functional analogy (hence this relation could be inscribed in an open series which would contain many other analogous relations) and also remain entirely singular, irreducible to one another, offering no guarantee of analogy: Each relation, utterly unique, singular and irreplaceable, is part of a specific semantic or tropological system, and can be substituted by anotl1er. Each relation is apart of aseries, but is also able to comprehend the whole and stand for all the others.
If there is an analogy between the relation of Moses and God, analogy is here understood in a new sense, combining "the economy of analogy-the same only differed, relayed, deferred [rporte]-and the rupture of all analüg}T, absolute heterology:" 42 Itis an interrupted analogy, which once interrupted, is again resumed as an analogy between two absolute incommensurable heterogeneities.
Paradigm and Series
Thus, the relation between Moses and God can be taken as the paradigm, paradeigma, example, for a1l relations to the other. In both cases a demand is made for the other to show itself ("montre-toi''), and each time this demand cannot be fulfilled. What is asked to show itself cannot show itse1f in person; it erases itself in 'presenting' itself: disappearing in its appearance. Hence there can be no relation to the other or to God as such, there can only be a relation to the other as other.
The relation of Moses to God is exemplary and can function as the paradigm for all relations to the other, but this paradigm has no absolute privilege with respect to other relations in the open-ended series oE relations in which it is inscribed and that it makes possible.
The paradigm here is neither the producer nor the generator from wbich a copy emerges. It is not at the origin, arche, or the model already there, in nature, from which other relations originate. This series without commencement or end, without origin or hierarchy; is composed oE a chain oE relations, an open series oE relations, each unique and irreplaceable. The relation oE Moses to God is a part oE this series, wbich we may just as wen call, without paradigm, but apart that can always comprehend the whole. IE the series oE relations are analogous it is in their disjunction-they are interlaced but interrupted at intervals.
Read in this manner, even iE the relation oE Moses to God is to be considered as the paradigm oE all relations to the other, the relationsbip to the other need not necessarily be a "religious" relation understood onto-theologically. In ''Violence and Metaphysics" Derrida Eound it objectionable to call the relation wbich opens ethics, this bond or tie, religion. At that time, Derrida demonstrated that Levinas was unable to escape the theological ambit oE bis thought, that he was unable to keep the philosopbical texts and the confessional, theological writings apart.
43 Since those early pronouncements Derrida's own work has undertaken a serious engagement with religion, and he would be more tempted to accept the term religion, as long as this relation could be understood as the inescapable relationship to a non-thematizable X, a relation without relation to the totally other rather than an organized, positive, revealed religion. 44 Yet he would still maintain that Levinas's insistence on keeping the two realms separate leads to a metaphysical, onto-theological thought.
For Derrida, the impossibility oE rigorously separating the two relations-the relation oEMoses to God and the relation to the otherfrom one another is precisely the very condition oE any relation or address to the other. What cannot be denied is the primal importance oE the relation to the other, an undeniable tie or "bond" that precedes all determined communi~a1l organized religion, every onto-anthropotheological horizon. This bond would be what would link singularities to each other beEore any social or political determination. Thus what both sides oE analogy between the two relations point to is the law of the relation to the oth~tie prior to all anthropo-theology; a relation anterior to the bond between men, and prior to what links man to God. To have a relation to the other as otheris not to simply have respect for the other as human subject, which Levinas's notion of Autruiwould seem to insist on, it is to be in relation with that wbich comes, beyond being, whose identity is always yet to be determined. Perhaps the resemblance of the other to God as the movement of the ttace is that very "space" in which the undecidable coming of the other occurs. It is in this way that the coming of the other "can no longer be confused with the God or the Man of onto-theology or with any of the figures of the configuration (the subject, consciousness, the unconscious, the self, man or woman, and so on)." 45 12 Jaeques Derrida, Le toucher,Jean Luc Nanq (paris: Galilee), p. 218. All further referenees will be cited as LT in the body of the text. 13 Derrida goes on to add that this eeonomic relationship is also at the same time a relation of violenee and nonviolenee (188/128-9). The question of violenee in the works of Levinas and Derrida has been the subjeet of much eonttoversy, whieh eannot be broached here. 14 University Press, 1983), 271, renders this passage as: "whatever is other is neeessarily this specifie nature with respeet to another" (255d6-7). Also see Parmenides13ge and 164c. Derrida notes that even though the other is always saidpros heteron, this "does not prevent it from being an eidos (or agenre [genus] in a noneoneeptual sense) that i~from being the same as itself," as long as we understand this sameness to involve alterity (186/127).
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2S Analogy is also italicized on F.D 148, not reflected in the English translation on p.l00.
26 This is a quotation from TI 326/293. 'lJ We can find in the writings of Saint Bonaventure references to a resemblance (similitudo) between creatures and God. In the Commentary on the Senses he wrote that the likeness of creature to God is a relation of proportionalitas. The relationship of creature to God is that of the exemplatum to the exemplar, making every creature a vestigium Dei. For Aquinas, the foundation of al1 analogy is also the likeness of creatures to God. Analogical predication is founded on resemblance. In De Veritate Aquinas distinguishes the resemblance of proportion (convenientiaproportionis) from the resemblance of proportionality (convenientiaproportionalitas). In the Summa Theologica I Aquinas writes of an analogy of proportion, analogia secundum convenientiamproportionis, and proportionality, ana/ogja secundum convenientiamproportionalitas. In Aquinas, analogy plays an important role as a supplement to human logos in 
